Header menu link for other important links
X
Linear quadratic stackelberg difference games with constraints
Published in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
2019
Pages: 3408 - 3413
Abstract
In this paper we study a class of linear quadratic Stackelberg difference games with constraints. We assume that the leader has two sets of strategies. He announces only one set of strategies and the other set strategies are not announced but are constrained. We formulate the necessary conditions for the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium for this class of games. In particular, we show under a few assumptions, the necessary conditions can be recasted as a single large scale complementarity problem. We also provide sufficient conditions under which the solution of this complementarity problem is a Stackelbreg equilibrium. © 2019 EUCA.
About the journal
JournalData powered by Typeset2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
PublisherData powered by TypesetInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Open AccessNo
Concepts (5)
  •  related image
    COMPLEMENTARITY PROBLEMS
  •  related image
    Linear quadratic
  •  related image
    Stackelberg
  •  related image
    Stackelberg equilibrium
  •  related image
    Control engineering