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Foraging under competition: Evolutionarily stable patch-leaving strategies with random arrival times 2. Interference competition
Hamelin F., Bernhard P., , Wajnberg É.
Published in
2007
Volume: 9
   
Pages: 349 - 365
Abstract
our objective is to determine the evolutionarily stable strategy [13] that is supposed to drive the behavior of foragers competing for a common patchily distributed resource [15]. Compared to [17], the innovation lies in the fact that random arrival times are allowed. In this second part, we add interference to the model: it implies that a “passive” Charnov-like strategy can no longer be optimal. A dynamic programming approach leads to a sequence of wars of attrition [13] with random end times. This game is solved in Appendix A. Under some conditions that prevail in our model, the solution is independent of the probability law of the horizon. As a consequence, the solution of the asynchronous foraging problem investigated here, expressed as a closed loop strategy on the number of foragers, is identical to that of the synchronous problem [17]. Finally, we discuss the biological implications such as a possible connection with the genetic variability in the susceptibility to interference observed in [22]. © 2007 Birkhäuser Boston All rights reserved.
About the journal
JournalAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
Open AccessNo