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Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Profiles in Asymmetric Games
Published in Springer New York LLC
Volume: 9
Issue: 4
Pages: 1126 - 1142
Mendoza-Palacios and Hernández-Lerma (J Differ Equ 259(11):5709–5733, 2015) have introduced the concept of a strong uninvadable profile for asymmetric games with continuous pure strategy space and proved that such a profile is Lyapunov stable for the associated replicator dynamics when the profile is monomorphic. In the present paper, we establish that a polymorphic strong uninvadable profile is necessarily monomorphic. Further, it is shown that strong unbeatability is enough to guarantee Lyapunov stability of polymorphic profiles. A stability theorem for sets of polymorphic profiles is also presented and is illustrated using examples. © 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
About the journal
JournalData powered by TypesetDynamic Games and Applications
PublisherData powered by TypesetSpringer New York LLC
Open AccessNo