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Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities
Published in Elsevier
2016
Volume: 44
   
Issue: 2
Pages: 219 - 224
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to develop a solution concept for stability of coalitional games with externalities. The existing solution concepts for this class of coalitional games can be empty. Using the partition function form representation, we propose a new solution concept called equivalence nucleolus, which is shown to be unique and always non-empty. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
About the journal
JournalData powered by TypesetOperations Research Letters
PublisherData powered by TypesetElsevier
ISSN01676377
Open AccessNo
Concepts (7)
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    Convergence of numerical methods
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    MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
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    Operations research
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    COALITIONAL GAME
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    Partition functions
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    Solution concepts
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    Functions