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Performance pressure and peer reporting of infractions: a moderated mediation model

Priya Nair

LIBA, Loyola College, Chennai, India, and

T.J. Kamalanabhan

Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India

Abstract

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine how the relationship between performance pressure and unwillingness to report ethical infractions of peers is mediated by moral disengagement, while considering organizational cynicism as a moderator in the mediating relationship.

Design/methodology/approach – Data collected from 302 managers working in public, private and multinational companies were used to test a model employing a moderated mediation analysis. The strength of the indirect effects of performance pressure on peer reporting via moral disengagement was found to depend on organizational cynicism when tested using a generalized approach to simultaneously test combined, moderation and meditation effects as suggested by Edwards and Lambert.

Findings – Path analytic tests of moderated mediation supported the hypothesis that moral disengagement mediates the relationship between performance pressure and unwillingness to report ethical infractions by peers and that the mediation effect is stronger in the presence of higher organizational cynicism. Implications are drawn for organizations.

Originality/value – This is believed to be one of the first studies on organizational cynicism and moral disengagement experienced by managers in India. Further, the application of moderated mediation analysis demonstrates the combination of moral disengagement and organizational cynicism in a theoretically interesting way. In the context of the continued unwillingness of employees to report ethical infractions of their peers, these results may shed additional light on appropriate courses of action for organizations.

Keywords Moral disengagement, Organizational cynicism, Peer reporting, Moderated mediation, Employee behaviour, Managers

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction

Newspaper exposes and surveys reporting instances of frauds at workplaces are seen with increasing frequency these days. What is even more alarming is the finding that frauds committed by employees are more common than those by persons external to the organization (Shaw, 2002). Though ethical codes of conduct have been instituted to curb unethical behavior, research has been inconclusive regarding their effectiveness (Weeks and Nantel, 1992). Organizations therefore need an auxiliary control mechanism in the form of employees who take on the role of a silent police and report wrongdoing of their peers. It has however been observed in the past that employees are generally reluctant to report peers who indulge in infractions (Tatham, 1974). We attempt to study this disinclination. Based on extant literature, we posit that performance pressure increases

the unwillingness of employees to report unethical behavior of their peers thereby causing organizational damage. Further, this relationship is mediated by moral disengagement, which becomes more pronounced when employees happen to be cynical about their organization.

To explore these issues, we conducted a survey among managers of public, private and multinational companies in India. The survey instrument assessed the levels of performance pressure and extent of cynicism and moral disengagement among managers. Our overall model shows the main, moderation and meditation effects (Figure 1). Results indicate that, as hypothesized, high-performance pressure contributed to high unwillingness among employees to report infractions committed by their peers. Also, as hypothesized, we found moral disengagement to fully mediate the above relationship, which was further moderated by organizational cynicism.

The subsequent section will review relevant literature and develop the research hypotheses. This will be followed by the description of the methodology employed and the presentation of the empirical results. The paper will conclude with a discussion on the findings, strengths and limitations of the study.

2. Literature review and hypotheses development

Coworkers who are willing to report ethical infractions of their peers represent an important auxiliary control mechanism for organizations (Victor *et al.*, 1993). Peers are more likely than supervisors to be aware of coworkers' infractions. For that reason, managers' grappling with problems of misconduct should persuade employees to report their peers. However, before suggesting peer reporting as a method of control, we need to examine the work context that may influence employee assessment of whether or not they should report an infraction.

2.1 Performance pressure

Recent years have seen organizations focus on reorganization, innovation, operational efficiency and introduction of several exciting new products. Consequentially, the speed of functioning and pressure to perform on employees has also amplified (Srivastava and Bhatnagar, 2008). The components of performance pressure are discussed below.


Figure 1.
Hypothesized model

2.1.1 Work pressure. Organizations, now, are highly cost conscious and as profit margins get squeezed, employees come under tremendous pressure to bring in results with lesser resources for performance. Work pressure has been described as an undue emphasis on goals that organizations place on employees to attain, without the provision of sufficient accompanying means of goal attainment (Cohen, 1993). Such undue pressure to perform has been considered a reason for unethical behavior in organizations (Bellizzi, 2006). Pressure to perform, particularly, has been found to result in deceptive behavior and thereby reduces the level of ethicality in the context of purchase agents (Robertson and Rymon, 2001). As Jackall (1988) has argued, unethical behavior need not be on account of an individual's personality or value system but is often the result of an interaction with the work context. Unrealistic expectations, lesser resources and strict deadlines place demands on employees, on account of which they may resort to their own means of achieving organizational goals, some of them, inevitably, being unethical.

Psychologists have long suggested that work pressure has a dysfunctional effect on employees causing decrements in performance of cognitive and motor tasks (Beilock and Carr, 2005) Reduced cognitive ability may result in poorer evaluations of a given situation as fewer sources of information are attended to (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Consequently, when employees witness an ethical infraction being committed, inadequate attention causes poor evaluation of that behavior. The labeling of an act as being unethical involves evaluating it in terms of the organization's ethical code of conduct and/or norms of behavior. Inadequate evaluations of ethical codes and norms of behavior, on account of reduced cognitive capacity caused by performance pressure, can interfere with establishing a moral intent to report. Establishment of intent is a necessary precursor to reporting unethical behavior.

2.1.2 Time pressure. An added factor that affects an individual's capacity for ethical judgment and reporting infractions is the time pressure under which managers operate. Time constraints can contribute to a higher number of decisions that lead to unethical behavior (Sims, 1994). Under time constraints, it is often impossible to carry out an exhaustive moral evaluation of the alternative courses of action. Particularly in a crisis, decision makers have been found to limit their search for information that may help them make optimal decisions (Tjosvold, 1984). As Kruglanski and Freund (1983) point out, time pressure induces closing of the mind; on account of which employees may stop considering multiple alternatives, poorly process information and refrain from critical probing of a given seemingly adequate solution (de Dreu, 2003). Owing to time constraints, stakeholder interests tend not to be considered and therefore unethical decision making is likely (Christensen and Kohls, 2003). We therefore suggest that time pressure causes employees to spend less time evaluating the appropriateness of peer actions, resulting in little inclination to report infractions.

2.1.3 Intra-organizational competition. Organizations have long been using competition for rewards, status and even survival as a motivational technique (Churchill *et al.*, 1997). A competitive environment induces employees to perceive their rewards to be contingent upon comparisons of their performance against their peers (Brown *et al.*, 1998) adding to performance pressure.

A competitive environment has been found to create counter norms that are often incompatible with the espoused normative beliefs and values of an organization.

For example, if "follow the rules" is the organizational norm, "break the rules to get the job done" may be the prevailing counter norm that gets practiced in an atmosphere of intense competition (Jansen and von Glinow, 1985). Widespread counter norms that contradict ethical codes can reduce the willingness of employees to report infractions. We therefore propose:

H1. Performance pressure is positively related to unwillingness to report ethical infractions of peers.

2.2 Moral disengagement

People generally view themselves as moral and try to appear moral to others (Batson *et al.*, 1999). Hence, logic demands that when people recognize an ethical dilemma they would attempt to act ethically in order to maintain a consonant self-image. Ethical recognition, though essential, by itself is inadequate in ensuring ethical behavior. A supplementary process of ethical judgment is required, whereby individuals judge their behavior as acceptable and form an intention to behave accordingly (Rest, 1986). Ethical judgment thus operates as a self-regulatory mechanism that controls moral conduct.

Self-regulations, however, can be selectively deactivated (Bandura, 1999). This deactivation or moral disengagement is done by convincing oneself that ethical standards do not apply in particular contexts thereby freeing the person of internal moral controls (Barsky *et al.*, 2006). This deactivation, by freeing them of guilt, enables otherwise considerate people to perform self-serving activities that have detrimental social effects.

Moral disengagement has been found to partially explain illegal behavior (Young *et al.*, 2007), facilitate and perpetuate organizational corruption (Moore, 2007), increase the propensity for unethical behavior among students (Detert *et al.*, 2008), and act as a proximal antecedent of unethical behavior in group decision-making situations (Barsky, 2008). We therefore posit that:

H2. Moral disengagement is positively related to unwillingness to report infractions of peers.

Moral disengagement is not a stable personality trait but an attitude-developed overtime. Since ethical orientations are socially learnt (Kohlberg, 1984), there can be social and organizational factors that assist its development. Being unequivocally interactive in nature (Bandura, 2002), moral disengagement can be prompted by performance pressures.

When under undue performance pressure, it is quite possible that employees may be tempted to "cut corners". While doing so, the choice of inappropriate means to achieve personal and organizational ends may be made possible by disengaging the moral reasoning that could have otherwise hampered such action. Hence, performance pressure may cause moral disengagement.

Moral disengagement may expedite the decision-making process by operating to shield competing values from adding to the cognitive complexity of the decision. The competing options are quickly discarded as moral disengagement offers quick justifications and ways of displacing responsibility. An unethical decision then can be made with fewer cognitive resources, less complex reasoning and in shorter time. Time pressure therefore encourages moral disengagement.

Finally, intra-organizational competition may exert pressure on individuals to "get ahead" of their peers and encourage them to use inappropriate means to do so. Moral disengagement can help justify their methods to themselves and others. The use of improper means to get ahead of competition, made psychologically acceptable by moral disengagement, could similarly impact assessment of infractions of others. Moral disengagement may make others' infractions appear less immoral. Such a lenient assessment can reduce willingness to report.

Hence, it is reasonable to propose that:

H3. Moral disengagement mediates the relationship between performance pressure and unwillingness to report infractions of peers.

2.3 The moderating effect of organizational cynicism
The recent global meltdown affecting every kind of industry has altered employee-employer relations. Organizational attempts at "rightsizing" and "cost restructuring" in a bid to contain costs have made employees increasingly cynical, believing that principles of honesty, fairness and sincerity are being sacrificed to further the self-interests of leaders, leading to actions based on hidden motives and deceptions (Abraham, 2000). Feelings of mistrust and sarcasm have been accentuated by the unearthing of unashamed mismanagement and confessed fraud by certain corporate leaders in India. The resultant cynicism towards one's employing organization has been described as: a belief that the organization lacks integrity; negative feelings toward the organization and tendencies of disapproval and critical behaviors toward the organization that are consistent with the above belief and feeling (Dean *et al.*, 1998).

Cynical employees are more likely to perceive inconsistencies between organizational goals and practices and for this reason doubt the integrity of their organization. Yet, unlike highly committed employees, they are less likely to proactively raise these questions as this would create a cognitive dissonance between their attitude and behavior – people who question the integrity of their organization hardly need to be personally committed to it. When an employee is cynical and believes that his/her organization is unscrupulous and self-serving, reporting an unscrupulous peer would appear to be futile and consequently may not be attempted.

We expect organizational cynicism to enhance the relationship between performance pressure and unwillingness to report infractions, augment the positive relationship between performance pressure and moral disengagement and finally increase the disinclination of a disengaged employee to report peer infractions. We therefore suggest the following:

H4a. Organizational cynicism moderates the relationship between performance pressure and unwillingness to report ethical infractions of peers. Specifically, higher levels of organizational cynicism strengthen the relationship between performance pressures and unwillingness to report infractions of peers (direct effect).

H4b. Organizational cynicism moderates the relationship between performance pressure and moral disengagement. Specifically, higher levels of organizational cynicism will strengthen the relationship between performance pressures and moral disengagement (Stage 1 indirect effect).

H4c. Organizational cynicism moderates the relationship between moral disengagement and unwillingness to report infractions of peers. Specifically, higher levels of organizational cynicism strengthen the relationship between moral disengagement and unwillingness to report infractions of peer (Stage 2 indirect effect).

H4d. Organizational cynicism moderates the strength of indirect effects of performance pressures on unwillingness to report infractions of peers via moral disengagement (indirect effect).

2.4 Unwillingness to report infractions of peers
Our dependent variable is whether individuals who are aware of unethical conduct on the part of coworkers will form an intention to report it to higher authorities. Peer reporting is a kind of whistle blowing which is:

> [. . .] the disclosure by a current or former organizational member of illegal, inefficient, or unethical practices in an organization to persons or parties who have the power or resources to take action (Near and Miceli, 1985, p. 4).

The major difference being that peer reporting describes lateral control attempts at observation and reporting the wrongdoing of peers. Since peer reporting can be used as an important tool of control over unethical behavior within an organization, the factors that encourage such reporting deserve attention.

3. Method
3.1 Sample
Our study was conducted on a sample of managers chosen from organizations that had a declared ethical code of conduct, with a variety of experiences (junior, middle and senior management), age and gender. We used a self-administered questionnaire as the data-collection tool and employed snowball sampling to generate referrals from different departments within each company. A total 500 questionnaires were delivered to respondents out of which 304 were returned. Two questionnaires were incomplete and had to be discarded, leaving 302 usable responses. The response rate of 61 percent was higher than usually seen in survey research. Profile of the sample in terms of age, experience and the sector they work in is presented in Table I.

3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Dependent variable (Y) – unwillingness to report infractions. Our dependent variable is the extent of unwillingness among managers to report ethical infractions committed by their peers. It was measured using a single item, "Will you report your colleague(s) to higher ups if you found them engaging in any infractions?" Anchored on a five-point Likert scale, with 1 – definitely will report and 5 – definitely will not report the ethical infraction to higher authorities. A higher score therefore indicated a greater unwillingness to report infractions.

3.2.2 Independent variable (X) – performance pressure. A four-item version of the instrument developed by Robertson and Rymon (2001) was employed to measure work pressure. Anchored on a five-point Likert scale, a high score (5) indicated higher work pressure. This scale included items such as "Lately my department has been under

Variables	%
Gender	
Male	77
Female	23
Years of experience	
<5	17
5-10	29
11-15	32
16-20	16
21-25	5
>25	1
Sectors	
IT/ITES/BPO	23
Healthcare/hospitality	6
Telecomm	5
Finance/insurance/banking	17
Chemicals/energy	10
Engineering/infrastructure	8
Auto/auto equipment	23
Durables/FMCG/electronics	3
Real estate/construction	5

Table I.
Profile of respondents

Note: $n = 302$

intense pressure to reduce the total cost" and "I will not last long in my job if I do not perform".

Intra-organizational competition was measured using six items that included "The amount of recognition I get in this company depends on how my performance compares to other employees" and "Everybody in my department is concerned with finishing at the top of the performance rankings".

Time pressure was measured using two items: "At work, I have to make decisions under a great deal of time pressure" and "At work, I feel I have to take decisions fast".

3.2.3 Mediator (M) – moral disengagement. Moral disengagement was assessed with a measure used by Detert *et al.* (2008). However, because Detert's 24-item scale was developed for use with students in an academic scenario, we adapted it to fit the population of our study (e.g. "If the professor doesn't discipline cheaters, students should not be blamed for cheating" was changed to "If the company does not discipline wrongdoers, employees should not be blamed for infractions". The items were assessed on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

3.2.4 Moderator (Z) – organizational cynicism. To measure organizational cynicism, nine items developed by Eaton and Struthers (2002) were used. The items were assessed on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

3.3 Empirical validation of scales
Reliability, validity and unidimensionality of the measures were checked to validate the instrument. The Cronbach's alpha measures for all the constructs (except for single item – unwillingness to report ethical infractions) are presented in Table II. Face and

content validity were ensured by a comprehensive review of relevant literature
and examination by four subject matters experts and four industry practitioners.
Additionally, comparative fit index (CFI) was computed using confirmatory factor
analysis, which gave a good indication of unidimensionality. Convergent validity
was assessed using Bentler-Bonnet fit index (BFI), which in our study indicated
high convergent validity of the measurement scales.

3.4 Model estimation and results

After proving the unidimensionality of the three independent variables, we proceeded
to develop a second-order factor model to test whether work pressure, time pressure
and intra-organizational competition factors load on an overall construct that may be
termed performance pressure (using Lisrel Version 8.7). The model was found to fit
very well with a normed fit index (NFI) = 0.933, CFI = 0.959 and root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.07 (Figure 2).

As shown in Table III, performance pressure was found to correlate to
unwillingness to report infractions of peers (0.310) supporting *H1*. Also it was found
to correlate with moral disengagement (0.474) supporting *H2*. Moral disengagement
has been found to correlate with unwillingness to report infraction as seen (0.629)
supporting *H3*. We then proceeded to gather stronger evidence of causality.

3.5 Analytical approach

According to Muller *et al.* (2005), support for the moderated mediation model showed in
Figure 1 can be claimed if the following four conditions are met:

(1) the independent variable significantly predicts the dependent variable in
Regression 1;

(2) the independent variable × moderator product term in Regression 1 is not
significant;

(3) the independent variable significantly predicts the mediator in Regression 2;
and

(4) the mediator × moderator product term significantly predicts the dependent
variable in Regression 3.

We tested *H4d* by conducting a moderated mediation analysis as outlined above. Each
product term was calculated using mean centered scores for both of its components.

Construct	No. of items	Cronbach's α	χ^2	df	RMSEA	NFI	CFI
Moral disengagement	19	0.92	771.53	252.00	0.07	0.93	0.95
Work pressure	4	0.76	22.18	2.00	0.11	0.94	0.95
Intra-organizational competition	6	0.76	24.39	9.00	0.04	0.96	0.97
Organizational cynicism	9	0.91	84.01	27.00	0.06	0.97	0.98
Time pressure	2	0.82					

Notes: CFI, comparative fit index > 0.90 indicates unidimensionality; NFI, normed fit index
(BFI) > 0.90 indicates convergent validity; RMSEA – root mean square error of approximation ≤ 0.08
indicates good fit (Hair *et al.*, 1998); Cronbach's α = 0.70 and above indicates good reliability
(Nunnally, 1988)

Table II.
Reliability, validity and
unidimensionality
of scales

Figure 2.
Second-order factor:
performance pressure

Notes: $\chi^2 = 80.02$; df = 32; p-value = 0.00001; RMSEA = 0.071

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4
1. PerfPres	3.55	0.61	1.00			
2. OrgCyn	2.65	0.98	0.315*	1.00		
3. MorDis	2.87	0.81	0.474*	0.617*	1.00	
4. WRI	2.84	1.61	0.310*	0.426*	0.629*	1.00

Table III.
Zero-order correlation
coefficients, mean and
standard deviations for
study variables

Notes: Significant at: *$p < 0.01$; PerfPres, performance pressure; OrgCyn, organizational cynicism; MorDis, moral disengagement; WRI, unwillingness to report infractions of peers; $n = 302$

This procedure was done in accordance with Jaccard *et al.* (1990) to reduce the collinearity between the product term and its components. The results of this analysis (presented in Table IV) show that:

- The independent variable (i.e. performance pressure) significantly predicts the dependent variable (i.e. unwillingness to report infractions) in equation 1 – Condition 1 has been met.
- The I.V × Mo (i.e. performance pressure × organizational cynicism) product term in equation 1 is not significant – Condition 2 has been met.
- The independent variable significantly predicts the mediator (i.e. moral disengagement) in equation 2 – Condition 3 has been met.

- The Me × Mo (i.e. moral disengagement × organizational cynicism) product term significantly predicts the dependent variable in equation 3 – Condition 4 has been met.

Our model (Figure 1) proposes that organizational cynicism moderates all relationships in our model. This being so, we use a generalized approach to simultaneously test combined, moderation and meditation effects as suggested by Edwards and Lambert (2007). The results of testing mediation (presented in Table V) in the form of direct, indirect and total effects will explain how paths constituting these effects vary across levels of the moderator variable.

4. Discussions
By using a moderated mediation analysis (Edward and Lamberts, 2007), we have been able to estimate both Stages 1 and 2 effects as well as direct, indirect and total effects of organizational cynicism. The simple effects (left side of Table IV) detail the effects of performance pressure on moral disengagement (Stage 1 effects) and on performance pressure on peer reporting (Stage 2 effects) with high and low levels of organizational cynicism. The direct and indirect effects on peer reporting together represent the total effects of the entire model on peer reporting (right side of Table IV).

Predictors	Equation 1 (criterion: WRI)		Equation 2 (criterion: MorDis)		Equation 3 (criterion: WRI)	
	b	t	b	t	b	t
PerfPres	0.43	2.83**	0.33	5.32**	0.08	0.53
OrgCyn	0.62	6.95**	0.45	12.48**	0.10	1.03
PerfPres × OrgCyn	−0.25	−1.74	−0.24	−4.26**	−0.06	−0.41
MorDis					1.18	9.39**
MorDis × OrgCyn					0.20	2.01*

Notes: Significance at: $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$; PerfPres, performance pressure; OrgCyn, organizational cynicism; MorDis, moral disengagement; WRI, unwillingness to report ethical infractions

Table IV. Least squares regression results for the moderated mediation analysis

Moderator OrgCyn	Indirect effect (Stage 1)	Indirect effect (Stage 2)	Direct effect	Indirect effect[a]	Total effect
Low	0.56***	0.98***	0.13*	0.55**	0.68
High	0.09***	1.38***	0.02*	0.12**	0.14
Difference	−0.47***	0.40**	−0.11*	−0.43**	−0.54

Notes: *Not significance, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$; [a]difference = high − low (significance is tested by interaction); entries in the table are simple effects computed from equations 2 and 3 using "b" (unstandardized coefficient estimates from equation 1, Table III); organization cynicism is equal to −0.98 and 0.98 for low and high, respectively (i.e. one standard deviation above and below the mean of centered organization cynicism variable; the bias-corrected confidence intervals derived from bootstrap samples were used to test indirect effects and difference in these effects for low and high organization cynicism such that if the 95 percent confidence interval excluded 0, then the quantity being tested was statistically significant
Source: Edwards and Lambert (2007)

Table V. Analysis of simple effects

Our results show that moral disengagement fully mediates the relationship between performance pressure and unwillingness to report infractions, supporting *H3*, while the direct effect (*H4a*) is not significant being close to zero (0.13 and 0.02 for low and high cynicism, respectively). Hence, *H4a* was unsupported. Organizational cynicism, however, has been found to enhance the relationship between moral disengagement and unwillingness to report infractions (supporting *H4c*). The role of organizational cynicism as a moderator is more prominent in Stage 2, i.e. the relationship between moral disengagement and unwillingness to report (supporting *H4d*) than in Stage 1, i.e. between performance pressure and moral disengagement (*H4b*). Our findings are in line with the conclusions of Detert *et al.* (2008) by demonstrating that distrustful organizational cynics are less likely to report peer infractions on account of being freed from internal moral control.

Organizational cynicism is an attitude employees develop at work and by increasing performance expectations from employees without offering additional resources or time, organizations are, in fact, acting in ways consistent with highly cynical employees' expectations regarding treatment. Further, failure on the part of organizations to reprimand wrong doers may fuel disengagement and cynicism. When infractions go unreported and/or unpunished, employees may begin to consider them as "normal" leading to non-reporting and consequent perpetuation of unethical behavior. It is therefore imperative that organizations stand up to their espoused ideals on ethical behavior to cultivate a climate of trust and integrity. A process-based appraisal system, which in addition to looking at process key performance areas, emphasizes group rather than individual goals, can reduce the detrimental effects of intra-organizational competition and facilitate collaboration. Ethical standards should to be included as evaluation criteria for performance, and having instituted ethical codes of conduct, organizations ought to sincerely adhere to it in letter and spirit. Initiating debate and discussion on ethical dilemmas through training and value-based role modeling by top management can go a long way in reiterating ethical standards and thereby reduce chances of disengagement.

5. Strengths and limitations

The strength of this study that deserves mention is the use of moderated mediation technique to illustrate the role of moral disengagement and organizational cynicism in peer reporting. This analysis technique has enabled description of moral disengagement as an attitudinal mechanism through which a questionable ethical culture can influence employees, as well as the pervasiveness of influence of cynicism on employee attitudes and intentions. However, the study has a few limitations. First, the use of a self-report, cross-sectional questionnaire to collect data on all measures increases the potential for common method variance. Second, this study covered organizations mainly in Southern India. Further studies could include organizations from other parts of India to achieve better generalizability. Third, this study considers only ethical intentions as an outcome; future research may examine the impact of organizational cynicism and moral disengagement on ethical behavior. Fourth, even though it is generally accepted that employees of private and multinational companies have to deal with more work pressure than public sector companies' employees, we did not find any support for such an assumption in our study. We performed an ANOVA to test mean difference in our study variables between Indian private and public sector companies

and multinationals. The results show a non-significant difference for performance pressure, moral disengagement, organizational cynicism and unwillingness to report (F-values 2.71, 0.90, 0.81 and 1.99, respectively, $p > 0.05$). It must be admitted here that our sample was unequally distributed across the three. In total, 80 percent of our respondents were from private companies and the rest were distributed between public sector companies and multinationals. Hence, we ran Levene test for homogeneity of variances on our study variables between the three types and found that all variables had p-values > 0.05 implying equality of variances before attempting an ANOVA. Finally, though we collected data from across various sectors, we have not controlled for their possible influence. Future studies may use sector and company type as control variables while examining the aforementioned relationships.

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About the authors

Priya Nair is an Assistant Professor in Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management at Loyola Institute of Business Administration (LIBA). She has nine + years of experience in academics and training and offers courses in organizational behavior, organization theory, structure and design and human resource management. A university rank holder and gold medalist at all three levels (pre-degree, degree and post graduation), she started her career by designing and conducting personality development and career design workshops for students in India and abroad. Currently, pursuing the Doctoral program at the Department of Management Studies, IIT Madras (www.iitm.ac.in), her research interests include business ethics, emotions and decision making and creativity and leadership. She has presented papers at Indian and international conferences. Priya Nair is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: priyarajeev@liba.edu

T.J. Kamalanabhan has a PhD in Organizational Psychology, an MPhil in Organizational Psychology and a PGDBM – Post-graduate Diploma in Business Management. He has around 20 years of experience in academics and consultancy projects. He obtained a Fulbright fellowship for research and teaching at the Department of International Business, Washington State University, Pullman, USA in 2002, and was awarded a DAAD Fellowship to visit Germany under (German Academic Exchange Programme) to do research in entrepreneurship at the Department of Management, University of West Saxony, Zwickau, Germany in 1998. He is a regular Visiting Faculty at the Department of Management and Law, Multimedia University, Melaka, Malaysia; University College of Technology and Management Malaysia (KUTPM), Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia; Faculty of Management, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya, Malaysia; and a visiting research fellow at KNU University, Daegu, South Korea.